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ABSTRACT: When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have 
been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects 
interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will 
argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in 
that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for 
argumentation theory than it once seemed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous and rational arguer do? 
Should she give up her belief in the face of such disagreement? Stick to her guns? 
Split the difference? Suspend judgment? All of these options have been defended in 
the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement. This literature, of 
considerable interest on its own, also brings to mind the controversy launched by 
Robert Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement’, thus raising the question: 
Does the ‘depth’ of a disagreement have implications concerning the appropriate 
argumentative response to disagreement among epistemic peers?  
 In this paper I will first explore the epistemology-of-disagreement literature 
on its own terms, and argue that (a) it conflates cases that should be treated 
differently, (b) rests far too heavily on an under-analyzed notion of ‘epistemic peer’, 
and (c) when ‘peerhood’ is suitably specified much of the controversy evaporates. I 
will then turn to issues concerning argumentation and argue both that Fogelin’s 
case concerning deep disagreement is problematic and that once ‘peerhood’ is 
introduced ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory 
than it has seemed. 
 
2. HOW SHOULD AN EPISTEMIC AGENT RESPOND TO PEER DISAGREEMENT? CAN 
SUCH DISAGREEMENTS BE REASONABLE?  
 
Consider cases of seemingly reasonable disagreement among peers. In legal cases, 
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jurors can seem to reasonably disagree about the guilt of a defendant in a difficult 
case.  Scientists seem to reasonably disagree about the cause of the extinction of the 
dinosaurs, the safety and effectiveness of a wide range of drugs and medical 
procedures, and many other live topics as well. Politicians and citizens seem to 
reasonably disagree – at least some of their disagreements seem reasonable – about 
the legalization of marijuana use, same sex marriage, the appropriate size of the 
foreign aid budget, etc. Religious believers seem to reasonably disagree about all 
sorts of doctrinal questions and interpretations of mutually accepted central texts, 
and of course about matters that cut across different faith traditions. And 
philosophers seem to disagree, at least sometimes reasonably, about almost 
everything. Consider the remark of Peter van Inwagen concerning his differences 
with David Lewis: 
 
How can I believe (as I do) that free will is incompatible with determinism or that 
unrealized possibilities are not physical objects or that human beings are not four-
dimensional things extended in time as well as in space, when David Lewis – a 
philosopher of truly formidable intelligence and insight and ability – rejects these 
things I believe and is already aware of and understands perfectly every argument 
that I could produce in their defense? (van Inwagen, 1996, p. 138, cited in Feldman, 
2006, p. 218) 
 
It may be unclear whether the disagreement between van Inwagen and Lewis is 
reasonable. But some such disagreements will surely strike some of us as 
reasonable. As Richard Feldman puts it, such cases “involve intelligent, serious, and 
thoughtful people with access to the relevant available information who come to 
different and incompatible conclusions. At least superficially, both parties to the 
disagreement seem to be reasonable in their beliefs. There is at least a temptation to 
say that people on both sides are reasonable, and thus that they are cases in which 
reasonable people can disagree.” (Feldman, 2006, p. 219) Indeed, “Cases of 
seemingly reasonable disagreements are all around us.” (ibid., p. 217) Nevertheless, 
Feldman holds that despite appearances, such cases are not reasonable. In such 
cases, Feldman says, participants should give up their belief (once the disagreement 
is revealed) and suspend judgment:  
 
[In such cases] the skeptical conclusion is the reasonable one: it is not the case that 
both points of view are reasonable, and it is not the case that one’s own point of 
view is somehow privileged. Rather, suspension of judgment is called for. (ibid., p. 
235) 
 
In order to understand Feldman’s reasoning here, let’s consider some cases that 
have received extensive treatment in the literature. 
 
Restaurant Case: We are out among friends at a familiar restaurant. The bill comes, 
we agree to split it evenly, we’re both good at mental arithmetic and we each 
calculate our shares. I get $43, you get $45.  
 
What should we do? According to David Christensen, we should lower our 
confidence in our answers in light of our disagreement. Each of us should revise our 
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beliefs in the direction of the other’s: “I should lower my confidence that my share is 
$43 and raise my confidence that it’s $45. In fact, I think (though this is perhaps less 
obvious) that I should now accord these two hypotheses roughly equal credence.” 
(Christensen, 2007, p. 193) As Christensen emphasizes, such disagreements are 
good things, epistemically speaking: my colleague’s differing opinion provides an 
opportunity for epistemic improvement. (ibid., p. 194) 
 Why not say that in this case I should think my colleague, a peer, got it wrong 
this time and so I should not revise? Christensen’s answer rests on the fact that our 
situations are symmetrical: my colleague can reason in the very same way. So if the 
disagreement gives me good reason to believe that she erred in this case, she has 
equally good reason to think that I erred. And I can see this from my own 1st-person 
perspective. As Christensen says, I should use my peers as checks on my own 
thinking: “Fortunately, trapped though I am in my own epistemic perspective, I am 
perfectly capable of taking an impartial attitude toward some of my own beliefs and 
using the varied opinions of others as resources for my own epistemic 
improvement.” (ibid., p. 204) And so: “[I]nsofar as I fail to take [my peers’] beliefs 
into account when revising mine, I believe irrationally.” (ibid., p. 205) 
 The general lesson concerning peer disagreement, according to Christensen, 
is that we must (if we are rational) take account of our fallibility, of our being less 
than ideally rational agents. As he asks, “What’s the ideally rational response to 
evidence that I’m not ideally rational?” (ibid., p. 208) His answer is that we should 
regard peer disagreement as evidence of our actually having made a mistake. Peer 
disagreement increases the probability that we have. And if we’re rational, we 
adjust our beliefs accordingly. (ibid., pp. 208-210) 
 While Christensen recommends “splitting the difference” (ibid., p. 203) with 
our disagreeing peer so long as my peer is no more likely to be mistaken than I am, 
Feldman suggests that such disagreement in fact requires that we give up our beliefs 
altogether and instead suspend judgment: “My conclusion will be that, more often 
than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper 
attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on 
standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world 
skepticism…” (Feldman, 2006, p. 217) 
 Consider the situation-sketch in which such disagreement occurs: 
 
Pro: believes that p. 
Con: believes that not-p. 
 
 Feldman distinguishes between two stages in assessing the reasonableness 
of such disagreement. In Stage 1, Isolation, Both Pro and Con evaluate evidence E 
and come to their respective judgments. At this stage they are unaware of the 
disagreement. In Stage 2, Full Disclosure, Pro and Con thoroughly discuss the issue 
and recognize that they are peers and that they disagree. The question is: Can they 
reasonably disagree? Feldman grants that Pro and Con can reasonably disagree in 
isolation, but denies that they can reasonably disagree after full disclosure. Nor can 
they each regard the other’s (disagreeing) belief as reasonable; they cannot have 
“mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.” (ibid., p. 220) 
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 Feldman considers and rejects four reasons for thinking that such 
disagreements might be reasonable: both parties might have private evidence that 
the other lacks; the parties might have different frameworks/starting points; they 
might both be entitled to self-trust; and they each might benefit from divided 
evidence. It will be worthwhile briefly to consider the second, and Feldman’s 
response, because they will play a role in our consideration of ‘deep’ disagreement 
below. Consider disagreements that come down to different ‘frameworks’ or 
‘starting points’ (e.g., religious/philosophical/political): Suppose that I believe that 
belief based on faith rather than evidence is never reasonable; you believe that it 
can be in some domains or cases. Our disagreement involves some issue in which 
our differing starting points are involved, e.g., concerning the likely future of the 
Roman Catholic Church given the ascension to the papacy of Pope Francis. My 
prediction is based on such things as population measures and trends of Church 
membership on different continents, changing attitudes in those regions concerning 
such questions as abortion, gay marriage and extra-marital sex, the recent sex abuse 
scandal, and larger political forces at work around the globe, while yours is based on 
your faith in the God of the Church and His Divine Guidance of the new Pope. So we 
start from very different frameworks, and arrive at very different beliefs concerning 
the future of the Church. Can our disagreement be reasonable? Or, to take a very 
different example offered by Feldman, taken from the columnist David Brooks (ibid., 
p. 225), consider political disagreements between those who embrace the 
Goldwateresque virtues of self-reliance and independence and those who favor the 
Kennedyesque virtues of justice, tolerance and interdependence. Can such 
disagreements be reasonable? 
 It may seem as though such disagreements can indeed be reasonable: after 
all, my disagreeing peers (let us suppose) are just as intelligent and just as good at 
evaluating evidence as I am, and have the same evidence and care just as much 
about the truth as I do. If we suppose that they are as entitled to their starting points 
as I am, shouldn’t we think that our disagreement is, or at least can be, reasonable? 
The answer, Feldman argues, depends on what we say about the differing starting 
points or frameworks. Are these starting points automatically rational? Does their 
rationality ‘come for free’ (ibid., p. 225)? If so, disagreement can it seems be 
reasonable. But in full disclosure, how can the starting points retain their 
justification? Perhaps in isolation each might be justified, but once each party sees 
that the other’s starting point is justified in the same way (e.g., by intuitive appeal), 
how can she continue to think her starting point more justified? Feldman argues 
that suspension of judgment is called for: 
 
Apart from the fact that it conflicts with one’s own starting point, by hypothesis 
neither person has a reason not to view the other starting point as equally 
acceptable. The problem is that once these starting points are brought out into the 
open, they are every bit as open to rational scrutiny as anything else is. Once one 
sees that there are alternatives to a starting point one has previously preferred, 
either one has a reason to continue with that preference or one does not. If one does, 
then that reason can be voiced and its merits assessed. And the result of that 
assessment will be that one side in a disagreement withstands scrutiny or that 
suspension of judgment is called for. (ibid., p. 226) 
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Thus Feldman concludes that there is ‘no free lunch’ for frameworks or starting 
points; their rational status is as open to challenge and defense as any of our other 
beliefs. We will return to this matter below. 
 If Feldman is right, there is no good basis for the view that there can be 
reasonable disagreement after full disclosure. If not, can one side be reasonable in 
maintaining belief after full disclosure, or is neither reasonable? One might argue 
that Pro’s belief might be reasonable in that the evidence E objectively supports it, 
while Con’s, which is not so supported by E, is not. In such a case we might be 
tempted to say that there can be no reasonable disagreement, but that one side’s 
reasonableness survives: Pro’s belief is reasonable; Con’s is not. Feldman rejects this 
way of understanding such cases, arguing that while it may be correct that E 
objectively supports Pro’s belief that p, in realistic cases it doesn’t help to secure the 
reasonableness of Pro’s belief. Suppose E objectively supports p. Pro then is 
justified. But it is not obvious (in typical realistic cases) that E really does support p; 
Con thinks it supports not-p. In full disclosure, Pro sees that Con thinks that E 
supports not-p. Given the symmetry of their positions, Pro is not justified in 
believing that E supports p. So Pro is not justified in believing that p, even though, 
we are presupposing, E in fact objectively supports p. The problem remains: the 
symmetry of the situation renders reasonable disagreement in full disclosure 
elusive.  
 And so Feldman reaches his ‘skeptical conclusion’:  
 
[I]n situations of full disclosure, where there are not evident asymmetries, the 
parties to the disagreement would be reasonable in suspending judgment about the 
matter at hand. There are, in other words, no reasonable disagreements after full 
disclosure, and thus no mutually recognized reasonable disagreements. The cases 
that seem to be cases of reasonable disagreement are cases in which the reasonable 
attitude is really suspension of judgment. (ibid., p. 235) 
 
If Feldman is right, not only can there not be reasonable disagreements, it cannot be 
reasonable to believe that p even when E objectively supports it if one is in the 
situation of peer disagreement after full disclosure. This is a far-reaching skepticism 
indeed, extending at least to most of our religious, political, philosophical and other 
beliefs. Is he right?  
 The case for suspension of judgment articulated by Feldman has a long and 
distinguished history. As Thomas Kelly points out, Henry Sidgwick made essentially 
the same point in 1874: 
 
…if I find any of my judgements, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict with a 
judgement of some other mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no 
more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective 
comparison between the two judgements necessarily reduces me…to a state of 
neutrality. (Sidgwick, 1981, p. 342, cited by Kelly, 2005, p. 169) 
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Sextus Empiricus made it nearly two millennia earlier. So have Montaigne and more 
recently Keith Lehrer and the economist Robert J. Aumann. (Cf. Kelly, 2005, pp. 169-
70)  
 Nevertheless, Kelly rejects this view in favor of the view that Feldman just 
dismissed as not helping in realistic cases: A believer should not ‘split the difference’ 
or ‘suspend judgment’, but rather stick to her guns, as long as the evidence 
objectively supports the belief in question. Despite the intuitive appeal of 
conciliatory views such as splitting the difference and suspending judgment,  
 
Disagreement does not provide a good reason for skepticism or to change one’s 
original view…once I have thoroughly scrutinized the available evidence and 
arguments that bear on some question, the mere fact that an epistemic peer strongly 
disagrees with me about how that question should be answered does not itself tend 
to undermine the rationality of my continuing to believe as I do. Even if I confidently 
retain my original view in the face of such disagreement, my doing so need not 
constitute a failure of rationality. Indeed, confidently retaining my original belief 
might well be the uniquely reasonable response in such circumstances. (ibid., p. 170, 
emphasis in original) 
 
On Kelly’s analysis (as on Christensen’s and Feldman’s), the issue crucially turns on 
considerations of symmetry: How can I rationally stick to my guns if my evidence, 
etc. is counter-balanced by yours? The crucial difference is our contrary evaluations 
of the evidence: 
 
…things are perfectly symmetrical between us. Then a body of evidence is 
introduced, and we are asked to make a judgement about how strongly that body of 
evidence confirms or disconfirms a certain hypothesis. Suppose that, as it turns out, 
you and I disagree. From my perspective, of course, this means that you have 
misjudged the probative force of the evidence. The question then is this: why 
shouldn’t I take this difference between us as a relevant difference, one which 
effectively breaks the otherwise perfect symmetry? (ibid., p.179, emphasis in 
original) 
 
As Kelly notes, doing so does not mean we’re not peers, but only that on this 
occasion you got it wrong: “All I need to assume is that on this particular occasion I 
have done a better job with respect to weighing the evidence and competing 
considerations than [you] have.” (ibid., p. 180, emphasis in original) Suppose you 
reason in the parallel way and conclude that it is you who have done a better job on 
this occasion? In this case “The rationality of the parties…will typically depend on 
who has in fact correctly evaluated the available evidence and who has not” (ibid., 
emphasis in original): 
 
[T]he rationality of one’s believing as one does is not threatened by the fact that 
there are those who believe otherwise. Rather, any threat to the rationality of one’s 
believing as one does depends on whether those who believe otherwise have good 
reasons for believing as they do – reasons that one has failed to accurately 
appreciate in arriving at one’s own view. (ibid., pp. 180-1) 
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 Kelly’s view to this point might seem to presuppose that the fact that my peer 
disagrees does not count as evidence against my belief, but it does not. Suppose 
rather that my peer’s disagreement with me does count as evidence against my 
belief. Should we then split the difference with our peers or suspend judgment in 
cases of disagreement? Kelly says that we should not. Consider: In isolation, I 
unreasonably believe that not-p on the basis of E; you reasonably believe that p on 
the basis of E; my belief is unreasonable because E actually, in fact supports p. We 
then become aware of each other’s views. Now our total (shared) evidence is E: 
 
 E:   (i) the original, first-order evidence E, 
 (ii) the fact that you believe that p on the basis of E, and 
(iii) the fact that I believe that not-p on the basis of E. (cf. p. 190) 
 
In such a case E is the major part of E; the new evidence (ii) and (iii) should not 
force either of us to change our views. You would rightly reason: ‘Well, my peer 
disagrees with me. Nevertheless, the significance of that fact is minor compared to 
the strength with which E supports p. That strength doesn’t disappear just because 
my peer disagrees.’  
 Kelly concludes that “Our original evidence E does not simply vanish or 
become irrelevant once we learn what the other person believes on the basis of that 
evidence: rather, it continues to play a role as an important subset of the new total 
evidence E. In general, what one is and is not justified in believing on the basis of E 
will depend a great deal on the character of the first-order evidence E.” (ibid., p. 190) 
So even if we treat the higher-order evidence as evidence concerning p, “it does not 
follow that agnosticism or suspension of judgement is the correct response to such 
disputes.” (ibid., p. 190) More generally, if Kelly is correct, peer disagreement does 
not have the epistemic significance that Christensen, Feldman and other defenders 
of conciliation think it does. 
 Let us briefly summarize the state of play thus far. All three of our authors 
agree that the fact that a peer disagrees with one constitutes evidence that is 
relevant to the rationality of one’s belief. That is, they endorse Feldman’s principle 
that “evidence of evidence is evidence” (Feldman, 2006, p. 223)1: the fact that my 
peer disagrees with me constitutes evidence against my belief. For Christensen and 
Feldman, the strength of this particular piece of evidence is (at least often) sufficient 
to throw the rationality of my continuing to believe it into doubt; for Kelly it is (at 
least often) swamped by the rest of my evidence, which, if it objectively supports my 
belief, outweighs the evidence supplied by the fact of disagreement. Is this as far as 
                                                        
1 Feldman offers two formulations of his Evidence of evidence is evidence principle: “Evidence that 
there is evidence for p is evidence for p. Knowing that the other has an insight provides each of them 
with evidence.” (Feldman, 2006, p. 223); and “If S has evidence for the proposition that evidence 
exists in support of p, then S has evidence for p.” (Feldman, 2009, p. 308) Such evidence of evidence is 
best thought of in my view as indirect evidence – to have it I don’t need to know what it is or how it 
supports p. If I read in a reliable place “The experts have evidence that p”, I thereby gain (indirect) 
evidence that p. I don’t have the (direct) evidence for p that the experts have, but I nevertheless have 
evidence/reason to believe that p. (cf. Siegel, 1988) 
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we can go? Interestingly, both Feldman and Kelly modify their views – as 
conciliation recommends – in the name of ‘total evidence’. Let us briefly sketch this 
reconciliation. 
 
3. PEER DISAGREEMENT AS EVIDENCE AND THE TOTAL EVIDENCE VIEW 
 
Feldman has long been a prominent defender of Evidentialism, the view of epistemic 
justification according to which S is justified in believing that p at t iff S’s evidence at 
t on balance supports p. (Feldman, 2009, p. 294) Unsurprisingly, in this more recent 
paper Feldman argues that puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to 
abandon evidentialism. Moreover, he argues that there are “no true general 
epistemic principles about justified responses to disagreement other than the 
general evidentialist principle.” (ibid.) However, as we have seen, on his view 
‘evidence of evidence is evidence’; in particular, he holds that  
 
(7) The proposition that S’s peer who shares S’s evidence concerning p disbelieves p 
is evidence against p. (ibid., p. 298)2  
 
On Feldman’s view, (7) “expresses the key evidential fact about disagreements.” 
(ibid.) That is, Evidentialism + (7) is the whole story about the epistemology of 
disagreement. So: 
 
If S justifiably believes p immediately prior to t, and S learns at t that an epistemic 
peer with respect to p who has evidence comparable to S’s concerning p disbelieves 
p, and S does not learn anything that counteracts the evidence provided by this, then 
S becomes less justified in believing p at t. (ibid., p. 299) 
 
Thus Feldman embraces (a version of) what has come to be called the Total Evidence 
View (TEV): “It is the total evidence [including that concerning peer disagreement] 
that matters.” (ibid., p. 301, emphasis added) How strong is the impact of such 
evidence? On Feldman’s view there is no general answer to this question; it depends 
on the evidential state of play in the case at hand: “[I]nformation about peer 
disagreement [has] evidential impact, though what the overall result of learning 
such information will be depends upon the rest of one’s evidence.” (ibid., p. 302) 
There are no general epistemic principles about disagreement such as ‘suspend 
judgment’ (his 2006 view), ‘split the difference’ or ‘stick to your guns’. Rather, 
whether and how one should revise one’s belief in the face of peer disagreement will 
depend on the totality of one’s evidence. Sometimes the total evidence will dictate 
that one should abandon one’s belief and suspend judgment; at other times it will 
dictate that one should split the difference with one’s peer; at still other times it will 
dictate that one should stick to one’s guns. It all depends on the total evidence, and 
the evidential impact of peer disagreement will vary from case to case, depending 
on the relative strength of the evidence afforded by peer disagreement compared to 
                                                        
2 (7) is so labeled in Feldman, 2009, p. 298; I maintain the number for ease of reference. 
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the relative strength of the rest of the evidence operative in the case at hand. As 
Feldman summarizes his view, 
 
In defending these views about disagreement, I am denying principles sometimes 
defended under titles such as ‘Split the Difference’ or ‘Equal Weight’. However, I do 
not think I am disagreeing with a key thought that motivates such views. I am struck 
by the existence of disagreement and puzzled about its epistemic import. In thinking 
through this topic, a key question is whether it is reasonable to maintain one’s belief 
in the face of peer disagreement. While I am not endorsing universal principles 
asserting that it is never reasonable to maintain one’s belief, I am arguing that 
evidence of peer disagreement is evidence against one’s original belief. It is 
consistent with this that, in many cases, it is strong evidence against one’s original 
belief, strong enough to render that belief no longer justified. Thus, I continue to 
endorse the view that peer disagreement is epistemically significant and threatens 
to undermine the justification of many beliefs in areas of controversy. (ibid., p. 304) 
 
And he concludes: 
 
I have attempted to defend a conciliatory view about disagreements without 
defending any general, widely-applicable principle about justified responses to 
disagreements. Instead, I have tried to provide some support for the view that the 
key truth behind the conciliatory view is captured in the claim that the proposition 
that a peer disagrees with you concerning a belief is evidence against the 
proposition you believe. This fact, combined with Evidentialism, implies that when 
you learn of a disagreement, you acquire evidence against what you believe. Exactly 
what impact this will have on what is supported by your overall evidence is a 
complex matter and will depend upon the details of each specific case.” (ibid., p. 
311) 
 
Need Kelly disagree? While in his earlier (2005) paper Kelly defended the 
incompatible ‘stick to your guns’ view, in his more recent paper (Kelly, 2010) he 
does not disagree. As we have seen, Kelly earlier defended the Asymmetrical No 
Independent Weight View (ANIWV): It is reasonable to give no weight to the opinion 
of a peer as long as one’s own opinion is the reasonable response to the original 
evidence. (ibid., p. 136) But in his more recent paper he reverses course and judges 
ANIWV to be false. Consider this case, from Kelly, 2010, p. 137: 
 
The Conjecture: You prove a longstanding open mathematical conjecture, but your 
mathematician colleagues wrongly reject the proof.  
 
In this case, Kelly argues, you should lower your confidence, even though your proof 
E successfully proves p. Their rejection is misleading evidence, but it’s still evidence, 
so what it is reasonable for you to believe must reflect it. As Kelly spells out the 
lesson he takes from this case: 
 
One should give some weight to one’s peer’s opinion, even when from the God’s-eye 
point of view one has evaluated the evidence correctly and he has not. But why? 
Exactly because one does not occupy the God’s-eye point of view with respect to the 
question of who has evaluated the evidence correctly and who has not. Typically, 
when one responds reasonably to a body of evidence, one is not utterly blind to the 
fact that one has done so; on the other hand, such facts are not perfectly transparent 
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either. Even if one has responded to the evidence impeccably on a given occasion, 
one might still have reason to doubt that one’s performance was impeccable. Such a 
reason is provided when a peer responds to that same evidence differently. To give 
no weight to the fact that a peer responds to the evidence differently is in effect to 
treat it as certain that one’s peer is the one who has misjudged the evidence. But it 
would be unreasonable to be certain of this, even when it is true. (Kelly, 2010, p. 
138, notes deleted) 
 
And so Kelly, like Feldman, endorses the TEV: “[W]hat is reasonable to believe 
depends on both the original, first-order evidence as well as on the higher-order 
evidence that is afforded by the fact that one’s peers believe as they do.” (ibid., p. 
142) That is, one must combine first-order and higher-order evidence to achieve a 
reasonable view concerning p. These considerations are typically complex and 
depend upon the evidential details of particular cases. The main point here is that 
on Kelly’s 2010 view what is reasonable to believe in cases of peer disagreement 
depends on both sorts of evidence. Hence TEV. 
 Notice how similar Feldman’s and Kelly’s views are now. They both say that 
reasonableness is a function of evidence; that evidence includes higher-order 
evidence; that higher-order evidence is genuine evidence; and that whether or not 
(and if so how much) S should move in the direction of the disagreeing peer 
depends on the total evidence in play. Is there a substantial disagreement remaining 
between Feldman (the former champion of suspending judgment) and Kelly (the 
former champion of sticking to one’s guns)? It seems that if there is any 
disagreement between them now, it concerns the proportion of cases in which 
‘giving way to one’s peer’ is justified by the total evidence; i.e., how many is ‘many’. 
This seems a significant reconciliation indeed.3 
 
4. CAN PEER DISAGREEMENTS BE REASONABLE? (AGAIN) 
 
As we saw earlier, Feldman (2006) and some other conciliatory views reject the 
possibility of reasonable peer disagreement: because of the symmetrical nature of 
disagreements among peers, if it seems to a disagreeing peer that her peer’s 
contrary view is equally epistemically worthy, that fact should lead her either to 
modify her belief and split the difference with her peer or give up her belief and 
suspend judgment because she sees her peer’s view as being as well-justified as her 
own. Ernest Sosa and Catherine Z. Elgin disagree; both hold that reasonable 
disagreement is both possible and common. Consider: 
 
Headache: You have a headache. Your reason for thinking you have a headache is 
simply that you do. But this won’t help in the dispute with your boss, who thinks 
you’re faking. (Sosa, 210, p. 286) 
 
                                                        
3 It is worth noting that for both Feldman and Kelly (and Sosa, see below) ‘good evidence’  
‘potentially persuasive evidence’. Both reject the latter dialectical conception of evidence. (Kelly, 2010, 
pp. 170-2) This will be relevant below when we consider Fogelin and ‘deep disagreement’. 
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 Sosa notes that you cannot offer your reason to your boss in a dialectically 
effective way: since he thinks (and takes himself to have evidence that) you are a 
lazy employee who avoids work whenever possible and often fakes illness to avoid 
it, he will see your headache report as another such attempt. Nevertheless, the 
headache itself constitutes a good reason that justifies your belief. Sosa argues that 
the sensible thing in this case is to demote your boss: he’s not your peer (with 
respect to this question): A reason can be epistemically effective despite being 
dialectically ineffective. (ibid., p. 296) 
 Sosa offers a similar diagnosis of Christensen’s Restaurant case, suitably 
revised. Suppose that after our initial disagreement I do the calculation with pencil 
and paper and then again with a calculator and still get my original answer. Now I 
should think: ‘I don’t know what went wrong with your calculation but something 
did, because now I’m quite sure mine is correct.’ In effect, I reasonably demote you 
from peer status with respect to this question because I now have more confidence 
in my competence than in yours: “[W]hat changes is that after rechecking one is now 
more sure that one is right… than that one’s opponent is not inferior on the question 
under dispute. And this is precisely our position vis-à-vis our opponents on 
controversial issues, or nearly always so.” (ibid., p. 295) So on Sosa’s view it is 
reasonable for one to demote one’s opponent from peer status strictly as a result of 
the substance of the disagreement, even in controversial issues. Because of 
symmetry, it is reasonable for your peer to do the same. So both are reasonable in 
maintaining their beliefs, though neither’s reasons are such as to be dialectically 
effective in changing the mind of their disagreeing peer.4  
 Catherine Z. Elgin argues that in genuine inquiry, especially scientific inquiry, 
suspending judgment is too costly to be a generally defensible strategy. Her idea is 
that if scientists can work only with beliefs shared by all investigators, much if not 
most inquiry would be stopped by normal disagreement among investigators. 
Consider: 
 
Neanderthal: “Two paleontologists, Jack and Jill, are epistemic peers who disagree 
about the fate of the Neanderthals. Jack believes that Neanderthals were an 
evolutionary dead end. Unable to compete, they simply died out. Jill believes that 
Neanderthals evolved into later hominids whose descendants are alive today. 
Because the issue is complex and the evidence is equivocal, they come to different 
conclusions about it.” (Elgin, 2010, p. 54) 
 
 Elgin argues that in such a case it would be too costly to suspend judgment: 
“To suspend acceptance of all of them [i.e., controversial paleontological matters] 
leaves the paleontological community with few premises about their subject matter, 
yielding a flimsy and moth-eaten fabric of cognitive commitments. It is not clear 
how they should reason about the paleolithic period, if they can deploy only 
premises about which no peer disagrees.” (ibid., p. 65) On Elgin’s view, whether to 
                                                        
4 It is worth noting that while Sosa offers here a case for reasonable disagreement, it is not a case for 
reasonable peer disagreement, since what makes each side reasonable in maintaining belief in the 
face of disagreement is precisely that the disagreeing party is no longer a peer. Cf. also Feldman’s 
reply to Sosa (Feldman, 2009, p. 310). 
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accept, reject, or suspend judgment concerning p is a practical matter, dependent 
upon costs and benefits.5 So construed, reasonable disagreement seems innocent 
and common: no one is irrational in assessing the costs differently, as is suggested 
by the next case: 
 
Jury: “Some jurors think the defendant is guilty; others think she is not guilty. They 
all have the same evidence and, let us assume, the same reasoning powers. They 
disagree because they assess the evidence differently. It is clear to everyone that 
some of the evidence offered at the trial is misleading. A member of an opposing 
gang placed the defendant near the scene of the crime. A member of her own gang 
said that she was across town. The jurors disagree about which witness is reliable. 
Some doubt the first, since she bears the defendant a grudge; some doubt the second 
witness, since she seems like the sort who would lie to help her friend. Neither of 
the witnesses comes off as a stellar character. Jury members might also disagree 
about the weight that attaches to various bits of evidence. How significant is it that 
the weapon was never found? How directly does the statistical evidence bear on a 
case like this? What should they make of the absence of fingerprints?” (ibid., pp. 66-
7)  
 
Elgin argues that in such cases each juror can rationally retain her belief while 
recognizing the rationality of her disagreeing fellow juror. As Elgin argues, in the 
jury case generalized persistent disagreement would be practically problematic (in 
that the trial would not result in a just verdict but rather a hung jury). But in science 
and philosophy this is not true: reasonable disagreement permits both views to be 
further developed. Thus is acknowledged the division of cognitive labor. No one 
need be regarded as irrational. This is the best way to continue to develop and test 
controversial views. “In such cases [i.e., cases in which the relevant threshold of 
expertise/cognitive ability is met and the evidence is equivocal], peers who disagree 
have reason to consider each other wrong but not irrational.” (ibid., p. 68) 
 
5. WHAT IS GOING ON HERE? 
 
Let us step back and review the several cases and positions considered thus far.6 In 
all the cases and positions canvassed, the fact of disagreement constitutes evidence 
against one’s belief. In Christensen’s Restaurant case it counts heavily and perhaps 
supports ‘split the difference’, while in Sosa’s Revised Restaurant case that same 
evidence – the fact of peer disagreement – counts not against one’s belief but rather, 
in concert with other evidence (pencil and paper and hand calculator calculations), 
against one’s interlocutor’s status as a peer. In Kelly’s Conjecture case the peer 
disagreement constitutes evidence against the belief in the validity of the proof but 
can (presumably) be outweighed by both the proof itself and new evidence of 
various kinds (further review of the proof by both you and others, etc.). Elgin’s 
Neanderthal and Jury cases also treat disagreement as evidence, but of one’s 
                                                        
5 Elgin argues that the issue should be reframed in terms of acceptance rather than belief. This is an 
important suggestion that I cannot pursue here. 
6 There is of course more to the works discussed thus far than I have addressed, and many more 
works I have not mentioned. I regret the lack of attention. 
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disagreeing interlocutor’s error or the equivocal status of the evidence rather than 
of your error or her lack of peer status.  
 The cases taken together suggest that the probative force of the evidence 
provided by disagreement depends on not just the strength of other available 
evidence but also on such things as: How confident are you and your peer in your 
judgments, and how justified is that confidence? How careful have you and your 
peer been? How much further investigation has been undertaken once the 
disagreement has come to light, and has the new evidence thus produced provided 
reason to change the status of the beliefs involved or the reasonableness of the 
disagreement? Is there any special reason to reduce the weight of one of your 
judgments? Is the issue ‘adjudicable’7, such that one’s and one’s peers beliefs ought 
to be taken seriously? If so, how seriously?8  
 The cases also suggest differing positions concerning the possibility of 
reasonable peer disagreement: some suggest Feldman’s view that apparently 
reasonable disagreements are at least often not cases of reasonable peer 
disagreement but are better seen as cases in which suspension of judgment is the 
appropriate attitude; others, like Christensen’s Restaurant case, suggest that 
apparently reasonable disagreements are not such but are rather cases in which 
splitting the difference with one’s peer is the appropriate response. These 
conciliatory views suggest that apparently reasonable peer disagreements are only 
apparently but not genuinely reasonable. Others, like Sosa’s Revised Restaurant case, 
suggest that some disagreements are reasonable but are not peer disagreements 
because the disagreement itself challenges their peer status, and Elgin’s Neanderthal 
and Jury cases suggest that some are best seen as cases of genuine reasonable peer 
disagreement.  
 Perhaps further reflection on the nature of peerhood can help resolve this 
disagreement concerning the possibility of reasonable peer disagreement. What is it 
to be a peer, and what specifically follows from the fact that it is a peer who 
disagrees? Is getting clearer on peerhood the way out of these difficulties?  
 
6. WHAT IS A PEER? 
 
What is an epistemic peer? A quick survey of the literature indicates that there are 
quite a few different notions in play. Feldman characterizes peers as “intelligent, 
serious, and thoughtful people with access to the same information.” (2006, p. 219), 
he also characterizes ‘the same information’ in terms of “comparable evidence.” 
(2009, pp. 296-9) Christensen describes them as equally well informed; equally 
likely to “react to that evidence in the right way”; “equally intelligent and rational” 
                                                        
7 Here I rely on and recommend Elgin (2012). 
8 I have benefited here from Hadad (2013), which argues that there is an inverse relationship 
between the level of confidence one justifiably has in one’s first-order evidence and both (1) the 
weight properly accorded to higher-order evidence of peer disagreement and (2) the extent to which 
one’s methods of assessment of the probative force of the first-order evidence are ‘rationally limited’. 
Thanks to Hadad for insightful discussion. Christensen makes a point very similar to Hadad’s second 
point. (2007, p. 201) 
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(2007, p. 188); he also says that a peer is “one’s (at least approximate) equal in 
terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, etc.” 
(Christensen, 2009, pp. 756-7) Kelly says of peers with respect to some question 
that “(i) they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence and 
arguments which bear on that question, and (ii) they are equals with respect to 
general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from 
bias.” (Kelly, 2005, pp. 175) Gary Gutting says that our peers are “our equals in the 
intellectual qualities needed to make good judgments about a given matter” (2012) 
and that epistemic peerhood is a matter of “intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, 
thoroughness, and other relevant epistemic virtues.” (1982, p. 83) Nathan L. King 
says that peers are “equally intelligent” and “equally well-informed” (King, 2012, p. 
249) Elgin characterizes peerhood as involving “the same evidence, reasoning 
abilities, training, and background assumptions.” (2010, p. 53)  
  
 These characterizations of peerhood differ with respect to (at least) the 
following requirements: 
 
a) Evidence: Must peers have the same evidence? (Elgin, 2010, p. 53; Kelly, 2005, pp. 
174-5)? Approximately the same evidence? (Christensen, 2009, pp. 756-7; Elgin, 
2010, p. 57) Comparable evidence? (Feldman, 2009, p. 299) Access to the same 
evidence? (Feldman, 2006, p. 219) Must they be equally well informed? 
(Christensen, 2007, p. 188)9 
 
b) Epistemic Virtues (open-minded, rigorous, unbiased, charitable, fair-minded, 
reflective, intellectually serious, truth-loving, truth-seeking, etc.): Must peers be 
equally virtuous in every respect? Equally virtuous overall? Approximately equally 
virtuous?  
 
c) Epistemic ability (argument evaluation, evidence assessment, inference, etc.): 
Must peers be equally able in every respect? Equally able overall? Approximately 
equally able? 
 
d) Scope: Is peerhood something general or rather limited to judgment of particular 
issues? Are peers peers generally or only with respect to particular questions? If 
peers disagree with respect to a given issue, for Sosa the disagreement might 
provide one party with sufficient reason to demote the other from peer status, while 
for Kelly and Elgin they can remain peers – the disagreeing peer might be judged 
wrong on the particular question but still a peer. Moreover, sometimes it makes 
sense to limit peer status to particular questions (e.g., Neanderthal and Conjecture); 
at other times it seems appropriate to regard peer status as more general, for 
example concerning political issues (Righty: ‘Lefty and I are peers, even though we 
disagree about most political questions.’). 
 
                                                        
9 I here stop citing chapter and verse; suffice to say that all subsequent differing characterizations of 
the requirements of peerhood are manifest in the literature. 
HARVEY SIEGEL 
15 
e) Education/Training: Do education or training count towards peer status? (Only 
Elgin mentions these, but she does so quite plausibly I think.) If so, must the 
education/training be the same? Approximately the same? Similar overall?  
 
 As is clear, what candidate peers must share in order to count as genuine 
peers differs on the accounts of peerhood available in the literature. Some are quite 
strict, which has the result that there are few if any instances of genuine peer 
disagreement.10 On such accounts reasonable peer disagreements are hard to come 
by, since genuine peer disagreements are themselves hard to come by. Other 
characterizations are more loose and vague, allowing for more frequent satisfaction 
of the criteria for peerhood and so more cases of genuine peer disagreement.  
 Several authors note that these conditions for peerhood, if taken strictly, are 
rarely met. Elgin notes that “[g]iven “the vicissitudes of education and abilities, and 
the idiosyncrasies of evidence-gathering, ordinary epistemic agents are apt to have 
few epistemic peers.” (2010, p. 57) So she urges that we characterize it more 
generously, such that epistemic peers have “pretty much the same relevant evidence, 
reasoning powers, training, and background information.” (ibid., emphasis added) 
Feldman similarly observes that the notion of an epistemic peer is vague (though 
intuitively clear), and that efforts to make it more precise lead either to there not 
being any peers or to losing sight of similarities among disagree-ers that have 
epistemic significance. (2009, pp. 300-1) The important point, not to be lost by 
insisting on too strict an understanding of peerhood, is that peers enjoy a symmetry 
in epistemic standing; it is that standing that forces us to regard their disagreement 
with us as evidence against our belief: ceteris paribus, they are as likely as we are to 
get it right, and even when things are not quite equal their disagreement still counts 
against our belief. 
 The details of the accounts of peerhood in play also affect the prospects of 
reasonable peer disagreement: for example, if the fact that an apparent peer 
disagrees is sufficient to demote her from genuine peer status (as Sosa suggests in 
his discussion of his Headache and Revised Restaurant cases), there will be lots of 
reasonable disagreement but no reasonable peer disagreement since the 
disagreement is sufficient to render the parties non-peers. On the other hand, if 
peers can indeed disagree, their disagreement will count as reasonable only if the 
evidence is equivocal (Elgin). If they suspend judgment and so no longer disagree 
there is no reasonable peer disagreement (Feldman); similarly if they split the 
difference and so no longer disagree (Christensen).  
  
7. LESSONS FROM THE DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT PEER DISAGREEMENT 
  
What lessons can be taken from this complex literature? Here are some: 
1.  Sometimes the reasonable thing to do is split the difference; 
sometimes it’s to suspend judgment; sometimes it’s to maintain belief. 
                                                        
10 As King (2012) argues. 
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What is reasonable depends on both the total evidence and the notion 
of ‘peer’ in play.  
2.  Suspension of judgment is often a reasonable response to 
disagreement. (Feldman) 
3.  Disagreement offers the opportunity for epistemic improvement. 
(Christensen) 
4.  ‘Peerhood’ is ambiguous and peerhood is often hard to determine 
and/or establish. 
5.  The more demandingly peerhood is specified, the harder it is both to 
regard disagree-ers as peers and to regard their disagreement as 
reasonable. 
6.  The variety of cases treated in the literature (restaurant case, 
headache case, van Inwagen/Lewis case, conjecture case, scientific 
cases, political cases, etc.) are significantly different and demand 
different treatment. 
7.  There do not seem to be any general epistemic principles concerning 
peer disagreement, other than TEV. 
 
8. FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND ‘DEEP’ DISAGREEMENT 
 
I want next to connect this recent epistemological work on peer disagreement to 
Robert Fogelin’s well-known paper on ‘deep disagreement’.  Space prohibits a 
detailed presentation of Fogelin’s analysis. What is salient here is that Fogelin holds 
that deep disagreements cannot be resolved: “But if deep disagreements can arise, 
what rational procedures can be used for their resolution? The drift of this 
discussion leads to the answer NONE.” (Fogelin, 2005, p. 9, emphasis in original) His 
analysis is meant to apply to informal logic: “[Some] works in informal logic give the 
impression that they possess the resources to resolve such disagreements. With 
Wittgenstein I am skeptical.” (ibid.) Fogelin is clear that his skepticism applies to all 
genuine cases of deep disagreements:  “Is there any way of adjudicating a clash of 
this kind? I confess that I do not see how.” (ibid., p. 10) 
 One might ask whether Fogelin here “exaggerates a difficulty into an 
impossibility”, as Popper engagingly put it. (1970, pp. 56-7) Is it really impossible, as 
a matter of principle, rationally to resolve deep disagreements? Fogelin concludes 
his paper by insisting that it is: 
 
Still, what shall we say about deep disagreements? We can insist that not every 
disagreement is deep, that even with deep disagreements, people can argue well or 
badly. In the end, however, we should tell the truth: there are disagreements, 
sometimes on important issues, which by their nature, are not subject to rational 
resolution. (ibid., p. 11) 
  
 It is worth emphasizing that on Fogelin’s view, in cases of deep disagreement 
both rational resolution of the disagreement and argument itself are impossible. 
(ibid., pp. 7-8) Is he right that some disagreements – the deep ones – are such that 
both rational resolution and argument itself are impossible? Andrew Lugg 
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emphasizes this distinction in his response to Fogelin. Lugg insists that we must 
distinguish between having resources sufficient to engage in argument vs. having 
resources sufficient to resolve a disagreement:  
 
…the interesting case is the one in which individuals are able to argue yet unable to 
settle their differences, i.e., the case in which there exists a framework for 
disagreement but not one for bringing about its resolution… [Fogelin’s examples 
(abortion, affirmative action)] are cases in which the ‘language of argument’ is 
entirely appropriate. True, the parties to these debates have had little success in 
convincing one another to change their views, but it can hardly be denied that they 
have been engaged in argument (some of it at an exceptionally high level).  What 
makes these and similar cases interesting for proponents of informal logic is not 
that the parties fail to agree concerning the prerequisites for genuine argument but 
[that] their agreement with respect to these prerequisites is insufficient to settle the 
issues that separate them. (Lugg, 1986, pp. 47-8)  
 
 Fogelin may be right, Lugg suggests, that “individuals may find themselves in 
the situation of being unable to resolve their differences on the basis of shared 
commitments”, but it doesn’t follow that “in such cases argument is pointless and 
nonrational persuasion unavoidable.” (ibid., p. 48) Moreover, and more positively, 
he argues that rather than regarding argument concerning deep disagreements to 
be pointless because of the absence of shared commitments,  
 
we [should] take common viewpoints to be what individuals move towards rather 
than what they fall back to. Instead of thinking of shared belief as a ‘common court 
of appeal’, we should think of it as a product of discussion, argument and debate. 
When we engage in argumentative exchange, our aim is not to determine what we 
and our opponents can agree on given the information that we share but to derive a 
common position, to figure out what we should believe, to ascertain the correct view 
of the matter. (ibid., p. 49)  
 
That is, our shared presuppositions provide a starting point but do not determine 
the end point of our argumentative exchange. In such exchanges, “ideas are 
disentangled, coordinated and systematized, reasons are marshalled, suspect 
assumptions are isolated, alternative proposals are reviewed, and conflicting 
demands are negotiated.” (ibid.) Lugg concludes that Fogelin fails to take seriously 
enough his own view that arguing is something we do, an activity we engage in more 
or less well. Once we see it this way, worries about deep disagreements being 
“impervious to reason and antithetical to resolution by rational argumentative 
exchange” (ibid., p. 50) fade away. 
 Lugg’s critique and alternative conception of argumentation, conceived as an 
activity we engage in, seem to me quite plausible when understood as accounts of 
the activity of argumentation. But they do not cut to the heart of the matter in the 
way that Feldman’s analysis does, in that they do not engage Fogelin’s 
Wittgensteinian epistemological stance, which we must do in order to connect deep 
disagreement with the issues concerning peer disagreement discussed earlier. I turn 
to Feldman’s view next. 
 As Feldman notes, for Fogelin “framework propositions depend for their 
support not on other individual propositions but rather ‘on systems of mutually 
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supporting propositions (and paradigms, models and styles of acting and thinking.)’ 
Differences over these matters are not amenable to rational resolution. His 
conclusion [that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved] follows.” 
(Feldman, 2005, p. 14, citing Fogelin 2005, p. 911) Crucial to the evaluation of that 
conclusion is clarity concerning the constitution of a rational resolution of a 
disagreement. On Feldman’s view, “[A] rational resolution of a disagreement is a 
resolution resulting from the use of the methods and techniques of rational thought. 
These are the methods typically developed in critical thinking courses…they include 
the use of arguments and the logical analysis of evidence.” (Feldman, 2005, p. 15) 
Such a resolution is available “when there is some way of presenting arguments and 
evidence to which the rational response is a resolution of the disagreement (i.e., 
there is some way of presenting arguments and evidence that should lead to a 
resolution).” (ibid., p. 16) It is worth noting that on Feldman’s view a rational 
resolution must include the proper evaluation (ibid.) of the proffered arguments and 
evidence. Moreover, a rational resolution might include mutual suspension of 
judgment: this too counts as a rational resolution of a disagreement. (ibid.) In non-
framework examples, this is obvious. (‘Who won the World Cup in 2010’?) Does the 
situation differ when framework propositions are involved, i.e., when the 
disagreement is ‘deep’? 
 Consider Fogelin’s example concerning the moral standing of groups in the 
affirmative action controversy. Here the relevant framework proposition, ‘groups 
do/do not have moral standing’, can be critically scrutinized. Resolution/agreement 
might be hard to achieve. But this does not show that a rational resolution is not 
available. (ibid., pp. 18-21)  
 One might think that framework propositions are exceptions, and that 
rational resolutions are not available in disagreements concerning them, either 
because (1) participants have different evidence, (2) they can reasonably respond 
differently to the same evidence, or (3) the rational status of framework 
propositions does not depend on evidence. Feldman argues that none of these three 
reasons for thinking that framework propositions are exceptions succeeds. The first, 
that rational resolution is impossible because participants have different evidence, 
fails because in full disclosure all such evidence is shared or at least shareable, and 
even the fact of disagreement, when disclosed, furnishes both parties with shared 
evidence. (ibid., p. 20) The second, that rational resolution is impossible because 
disagree-ers can reasonably respond differently to the same evidence, fails both 
because it violates the ‘uniqueness thesis’ that Feldman defends in his (2007) and 
because if the responses to the same evidence in such disagreements are genuinely 
reasonable, a rational resolution is available: since both are reasonable, neither side 
has a reason to prefer its resolution to the other’s resolution, and so suspension of 
judgment is called for. (ibid., pp. 20-1) The third, that rational resolution is 
impossible because the rational status of framework propositions doesn’t depend 
on evidence, fails for the obvious reason: that rational status does depend on 
evidence. (More on this below.) And again, suspension of judgment is available and 
                                                        
11 The internal citation from Fogelin’s p. 9 is slightly inaccurate but not in a way that affects 
Feldman’s characterization or subsequent criticism of Fogelin’s view. 
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appropriate once the parties recognize that they have no reason to prefer their own 
favored resolution. (ibid., p. 21) So rational resolutions are both possible and 
available in all three cases. Thus Feldman’s conclusion: “Framework propositions, 
like other propositions, can be discussed and debated. They should be accepted or 
rejected, depending upon the evidence uncovered about them. And if the evidence is 
neutral, then suspension of judgment is the rational proper response. And this 
counts as a resolution of a disagreement.” (ibid., p. 21) 
 I think Feldman is right here, and that Fogelin is wrong.12 But in order to 
establish this, we must pay more explicit attention to the Wittgensteinian 
epistemological views that drive Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement. Is 
Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian argument right? I turn to this question next. 
 
9. THE PROBLEM WITH WITTGENSTEIN 
 
Fogelin’s case for his thesis that deep disagreements do not admit of rational 
resolution rests on his embrace of Wittgenstein’s views concerning (if I may put it 
thus) the limits of reason. For Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements 
involving ‘hinge’ (Wittgenstein, 1969, #341-343) or ‘framework’ or ‘river-bed’ 
propositions (ibid., #97) or ‘underlying principles’ or ‘forms of life’ (ibid., #358) or 
‘language games’ (ibid., ##455-458, 559-560). On Wittgenstein’s view, “…all enquiry 
on our part is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they are ever 
formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.” (ibid., #88, 
emphasis in original)  Such propositions, e.g., ‘the earth exists’ (ibid., ##208-210), 
‘every human being has parents’ (ibid., #234), ‘there are physical objects’ (ibid., 
#35), etc., are beyond rational challenge: they belong to “the scaffolding of our 
thoughts” (ibid., #211, emphasis in original) and are “part of the whole picture 
which forms the starting-point of belief for me” (ibid., #209, emphasis in original). 
Such propositions are exempt from enquiry, Wittgenstein argues, because they are 
both presupposed by enquiry and more certain than any reason we might have to 
doubt them. (ibid., ##32, 111, 162-163, 243, 247-253, 282, 307, 341) On this view, 
“justification comes to an end” (ibid., #192, 248) – in the end one has to say simply 
“my spade is turned”; “this is simply what I do.” (Wittgenstein, 1958, #217) 
 Is Wittgenstein right about all this? Are ‘hinge’ propositions or claims in 
principle beyond the range of critical scrutiny? There are of course libraries full of 
scholarly disputations concerning Wittgenstein’s views; I will refrain from entering 
into that scholarly fray here. But taking his claims at face value, there seem to be 
several reasons to doubt them – especially when considered in the context of 
argumentation and argument evaluation.  
 First: What exactly is being claimed when it is said that “justification comes 
to an end”? When Smith fails to offer a justification that Jones can or will accept, and 
cannot offer anything more by way of justification, what are we claiming when we 
say that her attempt at justification has come to an end: That she, in fact, can’t say 
anything more at that moment? That there is nothing more that could be said, in 
                                                        
12 It is worth asking: Is it true that in a deep disagreement there is no common ground? If there isn’t, 
can it rightly be understood to be a disagreement? I will not pursue this point further here. 
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principle, by anyone, at any time? There are of course deep epistemological worries 
concerning infinite regress here. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a blanket 
hopelessness concerning further progress is premature. Even if Fogelin is right that 
in deep disagreements sufficient common ground is lacking, nothing he says 
suggests that such common ground (if in fact necessary for argumentation) cannot 
be built, as Lugg suggests. Moreover, such a lack does not mean that a rational 
resolution of the disagreement is unavailable, as Feldman argues. And it bears 
noting that forms of life and their hinge propositions change and evolve – for 
example, is it really hard to imagine, in these days of genetic engineering, that one 
day soon we will not think it beyond doubt that ‘every human being has parents’? – 
so that even if Wittgenstein is right that hinge propositions are unchallengeable, 
there is nothing necessary or permanent about that status. 
 Second: In cases in which agreement cannot readily be found, should 
virtuous and rational arguers keep trying, or throw up their hands in despair (or 
disgust) and agree to go their separate ways (or reach for their weapons)? Simply 
accepting the Wittgensteinian contention here seems contrary to the spirit of 
argumentative virtue, and to run afoul of the requirements of a thoroughgoing 
fallibilism as well. That we might always be mistaken is reason enough to keep 
conversing, discussing, arguing, and thinking. 
 Third: What should be said of the fact that the examples of ‘hinge’ 
propositions offered are in fact regularly discussed and challenged/defended in 
many Introduction to Philosophy courses, thus seemingly undermining the 
Wittgensteinian claims that in these cases the question of justification is 
inappropriate and that calling such propositions into question is ‘unintelligible’? 
Asking why we should believe in the existence of the external world in the face of 
Berkeley’s idealistic arguments is perfectly intelligible and appropriate, as is asking 
why we should continue to claim to know things in the face of the familiar skeptical 
arguments. The Wittgensteinian view is a profoundly anti-philosophical one that 
fans of the philosophical investigation of argumentation should challenge. 
 Wittgensteinian views of rationality and justification are sometimes 
defended on the basis of the claim that a central sense of ‘rationality’ “places the 
main emphasis on the individual’s participation in a form of life”. (Winch, 2006, p. 
41) But this is problematic. Our ‘ways of making sense of the world’, which are often 
said by Wittgensteinians to flow from our forms of life, are not constitutive of 
rationality but rather are themselves subject to rational scrutiny along with the rest 
of our beliefs, judgments, actions, presuppositions and understandings. Granting for 
the sake of argument that such participation is necessary in order to make sense of 
the world and our place in it, the rationality of the beliefs, ‘hinge’ and other, that are 
presupposed by and emerge from such participation is not automatic but rather is 
open to and dependent upon the results of critical scrutiny.13 
 We should thus reject the Wittgensteinian starting point that there is no way 
to critically evaluate frameworks, forms of life, ‘starting points’ or ‘hinge 
propositions.’ 
                                                        
13 The points made in this and the preceding paragraphs are addressed at greater length in Siegel 
(2008). 
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 This point has been emphasized in the literature on the epistemology of 
disagreement considered earlier. As Christensen put it: “Fortunately, trapped 
though I am in my own epistemic perspective, I am perfectly capable of taking an 
impartial attitude toward some of my own beliefs and using the varied opinions of 
others as resources for my own epistemic improvement.” (Christensen, 2007, pp. 
204) Feldman also emphasized the point: “…once these starting points are brought 
out into the open, they are every bit as open to rational scrutiny as anything else is. 
Once one sees that there are alternatives to a starting point one has previously 
preferred, either one has a reason to continue with that preference or one does not. 
If one does, then that reason can be voiced and its merits assessed. And the result of 
that assessment will be that one side in a disagreement withstands scrutiny or that 
suspension of judgment is called for.” (Feldman, 2006, p. 226) That is: 
framework/hinge propositions are just as open to critical scrutiny as everything 
else. When we argue, there is no free lunch; no starting point immune from critical 
scrutiny. We should opt for fallibilism, not Wittgensteinian ‘forms of life’ or 
unchallengeable ‘hinge propositions.’ 
 
11. CONCLUSION: PEER DISAGREEMENT AND DEEP DISAGREEMENT 
 
It is well past time to conclude. How do these two issues relate? What shall we say of 
the relation between peer disagreement and deep disagreement? Happily we can be 
brief. Perhaps surprisingly, there can be no cases of peer deep (or deep peer) 
disagreement: if a disagreement is deep there will be insufficient shared evidence, 
background beliefs, etc. for it to count as a peer disagreement. By the same token, if 
a disagreement is between epistemic peers, it cannot be deep, precisely because 
peers will share enough to rule out depth, which (on Fogelin’s articulation of it) 
rests upon lack of shared beliefs and preferences. That is, for any disagreement, if 
it’s a peer disagreement, it’s not deep; and if it’s a deep disagreement, it’s not 
between peers. And in any case, there aren’t any deep disagreements as Fogelin 
defines them: not only are the beliefs and propositions involved in such allegedly 
deep disagreements open to critical scrutiny and evaluation, the Wittgensteinian 
views on which his account of such disagreements is based are deeply flawed. 
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